26 January 2016
Warranty Void if Label Removed – Attacking MPLS Networks
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) is certainly the most prevalent service provider technology used by major players to build and offer highly scalable value-added services allowing reliable transport of data and latency-sensitive traffic like voice and video. It turns out MPLS has remained largely unexplored by the security community and very little security research has ever been done in this area.
This talk will be a walk-through of research findings from assessing multiple MPLS implementations and the various key weaknesses that were found to affect a number of leading vendors. General MPLS and MPLS related terms and concepts will be briefly introduced to the audience, followed by an overview of a typical service provider network, classic topologies and basic traffic engineering strategies. Several network reconnaissance techniques will be presented that allow an adversary to partially or, in some cases, fully reveal the MPLS backbone Label Switching Router (LSR) interconnections by leaking internal LSR IP addresses. The attack scenarios against service provider infrastructure will then be followed by attacks on customers of the MPLS domain. It should be noted that none of the examples and demonstrations require access to the MPLS backbone, i.e. attacks are executed from the perspective of a client of the MPLS domain. This talk will be concluded with both general and, where applicable, vendor specific best practices and recommendations on reducing the attack surface of an MPLS network.
Stop Cybercrime, Protect Privacy, Save World
With the poor state of computer security and the ubiquity of data breaches, we appear to be headed in a one-way road to a post-privacy society. Some insight into the history and contemporary structure of cybercrime and financial fraud aims to illustrate the key players and methodologies of the shadow online economy, its implications and maybe even some infosec solutions with wider applications.